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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DOLLY PLUMB, et al.,

]

PlaintiffsAppellees,
vs.

j
|

Case No. 900012

i

Priority No. 16

STATE OF UTAH, et al.
Defendants.
MALCOLM A. MISURACA; HALEY &
STOLEBARGER; DOUGLAS B.
PROVENCHER; and BEYERS, COSTIN
& CASE,

]
]
]

Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
JURISDICTION
The order appealed from was certified as a final judgment pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) on January
2, 1990.

This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1989).
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ISSUE1
Did the trial court err in reducing the attorney fee
award where there was no evidence of record to support the reduction and the overwhelming majority of class members approved
of the court's initial award of attorney fees?
A trial court's award of attorney fees in a class action
is reviewed for abuse of the court's discretion. See Dixie State
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); In re Montgomery
County Real Estate Antitrust Litigation, 83..F.R.D. 305, 321 (D.
Md. 1979).

However, once the trial court determines what con-

stitutes a reasonable fee, it commits legal error if it awards
less than the reasonable fee.

Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at

991.

DETERMINATIVE RULE
Interpretation of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)
is determinative of this appeal.

That rule reads: "A class

action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval
of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise
shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as
the court directs."

1

In their brief, the appellants identify nineteen issues
presented for review. However, the appellants' argument treats
some of these issues only tangentially and ignores others (such
as issues 18 and 19).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an award of attorney fees to
the appellants, the attorneys for the plaintiffs in a class action
(the appellees or depositors).

The class action seeks recovery

of money the depositors lost when the five thrifts in which their
money was deposited failed.

The course of proceedings and dis-

position below are set out in the appellants' Statement of the
Case.
The appellees do not dispute the facts set forth in
the so-called Agreed Statement in Lieu of Record on Appeal (appendix D to Brief of Appellants), but have not agreed that that
statement of facts may be considered in lieu of a record on appeal. In addition to the facts set forth in the agreed statement
of facts, the following facts are relevant to the issue presented
for review.
1.

Between May 1987 and March 1988, after the written

attorney fee agreement was entered into between the appellants
and the Thrift Depositors Class Action Committee, sign-up cards
were sent to all prospective class memebers. One hundred percent
of those responding (some 80 percent of the prospective class)
accepted the representation of the appellants.

The depositors

also authorized the steering committee of the depositor organization, Depositors of Insured Thrifts (DOIT), to act on their
- 3 -

behalf.

See Record at 1562-68, 106, 726; exs. 23-25 from July

17, 1989, hearing.
2.

After the partial settlement was reached with

the state, 99.99 percent of the class responding voted to accept
the settlement and approved an award of attorney fees of up to
$7,250,000.

See Record at 1523-24, 1778-80, 2039-40.

3.

In a survey of the class members taken after the

partial settlement, in the first quarter of 1989, an overwhelming
majority of the depositor class (over 90 percent of those responding) voted to authorize DOIT and its counsel to continue their
recovery efforts on behalf of the depositors. See Record at 2280.
4.

After the trial court's initial award of attorney

fees and before the court reduced that award, DOIT retained independent counsel to represent the class with respect to the
attorney fee issue.

(That counsel represents the appellees on

this appeal.)
5.

Based upon the advice of their independent counsel

and their desire to resolve the issues before this court without
protracted litigation, the depositors, through their representatives, and the appellants have agreed to settle the attorney
fee dispute on the following terms:
(a)

The parties agree that a reasonable fee in this

matter to be awarded to the appellants is the sum of
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$5,400,000.00 as of December 6, 1988, together with interest
that has accrued thereon.
(b) The parties agree that the sum of $400,000.00,
together with interest that has accrued thereon from December
6, 1988, should be disbursed to and held by the depositors'
representative, DOIT, for and on behalf of the depositor
class, to pay the on-going expenses of litigation and other
expenses that DOIT determines necessary to further the interests of the class. At the conclusion of the litigation,
the balance should be paid to the class.
(c) The parties agree that 20 percent constitutes a
reasonable attorney fee on all amounts recovered for and
on behalf of the appellees in the future.
The depositor plaintiffs and the board of DOIT have unanimously
approved this settlement and agreed that this Court may enter
an order approving this settlement and dismissing this appeal.
(A copy of the parties' Stipulation to Dismiss Appeal on the above
terms is included in the Addendum.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The appellees are in an anomalous position in this
case.

On the one hand, they are the apparent beneficiaries of

the trial court's decision, which, on its face, appears to save
them $1,550,000 in attorney fees. Obviously, no one likes to pay
- 5 -

his attorneys more money than he has to. But, on the other hand,
the depositors feel strongly that they were poorly dealt with
by the defendants and that agreements they had a right to rely
on were not kept. They do not want their attorneys to be treated
the same way, and they feel that their attorneys cire entitled
to a fee of 20 percent of the recovered funds under the spirit
if not the letter of the written attorney fee agreement.

By

ignoring the depositors' wishes and their express authorization,
thereby frustrating their good faith undertaking with class counsel, the trial court has jeopardized the depositors' chances of
recovering much more than the $1,550,000 under the remaining
claims in the pending lawsuit.
While the depositors do not accept all of the appellants' arguments on appeal, they are pleased with the results
that the appellants have obtained for them thus far and want
the appellants to continue to represent them in prosecuting their
pending claims against other defendants.

The depositors over-

whelmingly approved a fee award greater than the trial court's
initial award and were satisfied with that award.

The trial

court abused its discretion in reducing that award in the absence
of any competent evidence justifying the reduction.

(Point I.)

The depositors and the appellants have now agreed to
settle the attorney fee issue for a mutually acceptable amount
that is even less than the trial court's initial award.
- 6 -

This

court should approve the settlement and allow the parties to
get on with the principal business of recovering the depositors'
money.

(Point II.)
It is in the best interests of all concerned to approve

an award of attorney fees that is acceptable both to the depositors and their counsel.

The trial court's initial fee award

and the settlement reached on appeal are acceptable to both sides.
The trial court's reduced fee award is not.

Therefore, this

Court should either approve the settlement of this appeal or
reverse the trial court's decision reducing the appellants' attorney fees.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REDUCING
THE ATTORNEY FEE AWARD IT HAD PREVIOUSLY DETERMINED
TO BE REASONABLE.
An attorney representing a class is entitled to an
attorney's fee from funds realized or collected by the attorney's
efforts on behalf of the class.

See, e.g.. Boeing Co. v. Van

Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); Citv of Detroit v. Grinnell
Corp., 560 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir. 1977).

- 7 -

A trial court's authority to approve a fee award to
the attorney for a plaintiff class stems from rule 23(e) of the
rules of civil procedure:2
Rule 23(e) requires court approval of any
class action settlement, even if the settlement is acceptable to the class representatives . This approval function extends to
any negotiated liability for attorney's fees
as well as the settlement on the merits.
Courts have used this approval authority to
review the settlements and, on occasion, to
reduce negotiated fees.
3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal .Practice, I 23.91 at
23-533 (2d ed. 1987).

The rationale for the court's oversight

function is that the court "must serve as a guardian of the rights
of absent class members." Grunin v. International House of Pancakes , 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir.), cert, denied 423 U.S. 864
(1975).

Otherwise, it is feared that attorneys will take ad-

vantage of class actions to obtain lucrative fees that they have
not earned.

The interests of the attorneys may conflict with

the interests of class members, since any fee award may reduce
the class members' recovery.

In such a situation, the class

has no one to represent them.

It is thus up to the court, as

the guardian of the public interest, to give voice to the voice-

2

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), which is identical
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), states: "A class action
shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of
the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise
shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as
the court directs."
- 8 -

less.

See, e.g., In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 560 F.

Supp. 963, 967-68 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,
86 F.R.D. 752, 758-59 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
This rationale has little force in this case, where
99.99% of the class approved an attorney fee award up to
$7,250,000.00.

The fee initially awarded—$5,800,000.00~was

well within the range approved by the class members. Moreover,
that award was based on competent evidence, presented in open
court and after a hearing at which the depositors had an opportunity to appear and voice their objections to the award. Before
making its initial award, the court was aware of all objections
to the fee award—both from depositors and from the defendants
—and had an opportunity to fully consider them.

In making its

initial award, the trial court considered and made findings,
based on evidence of record, with respect to eight different
factors.

It found that a fee at the minimum of the parties'

contingent fee agreement (20 percent) was reasonable, and applied
that rate to the $29 million portion of the $44 million recovery,
since the appellants had requested their fee only from the $29
million.
The trial court abused its discretion in thereafter
reducing the attorney fee award.3

An award of attorney fees

3
The appellants argue that the law of the case doctrine
precluded the trial court from reducing the fee award. The law
of the case doctrine does not apply in this case. Under that
- 9 -

must be supported by evidence in the record.
v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988).

Dixie State Bank

But once the trial

court determines what constitutes a reasonable fee, it is an
abuse of discretion to award less absent evidence of record supporting a reduction.

Ici. at 991.

The trial court's revision of its initial attorney
fee award was not justified by any evidence of record.

After

the court's initial award, there was no new evidence presented.
There were no objections to the fee award from depositors.

The

only objection to the award came from the special master appointed
to review requests for cost reimbursements to expert witnesses
and others, and the special master's objections were not based
on any evidence of record.

Indeed, the special master held no

hearings, took no evidence and heard no witnesses in the manner
contemplated by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 53(c). 4
doctrine, a decision on an issue of law at one stage of a case
is binding in successive stages of the same litigation. See IB
J. Moore, J. Lucas & T. Currier, Moore's Federal Practice 5
0.404[1] at 117 (2d ed. 1988). The reasonableness of an attorney
fee award is not a question of law but of fact. See, e.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Wollcrast, 11 Wash. App. 117, 521 P.2d
1191, 1197 (1974). Moreover, the law of the case doctrine does
not limit the power of a court to reconsider its interlocutory
decisions. IB J. Moore, et al., supra, f 0.404[4.-1]. Because
the trial court's initial award was not a final judgment, it
was subject to revision at any time before entry of a final judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). The only question is whether the
trial court abused its discretion in revising the award.
*
After submitting his report and recommendation recommending that the attorney fee award be reduced, the special master
held a hearing at class counsel's request but did not allow any
- 10 -

Where, as here, the trial court discounts a fee based
on factors not supported by the record, the judgment should be
reversed.

Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 991.

The trial court

abused its discretion in revising the fee award that it had previously detennined to be reasonable where no objections to the
award were made by class members and there were no exceptional
circumstances or other reasons justifying a reduction in the
amount of fees awarded.

IITHE COURT SHOULD APPROVE THE PARTIES' SETTLEMENT
OF THIS APPEAL.
Between December 6, 1988, when the trial court entered
its order awarding the appellants $5,800,000, and the present,
significant amounts of time and effort were devoted by counsel
for all parties to the issues concerning attorney fees, all of
which detracted from the main focus of the litigation, namely,
recovery of the depositors' funds.
Considering the length of time that has passed since
the appellees suffered their original losses and since the court's
original award of attorney fees, the parties to this appeal contestimony to be presented. The only evidence taken was by proffer. Any other evidence the special master may have considered
did not comply with such due process requirements as notice and
an opportunity to be heard, to present evidence and to crossexamine witnesses.
- 11 -

eluded that a settlement of the issues on appeal was in the best
interests of all parties.
The class representatives have retained separate counsel
to represent the appellees' interests in connection with the
attorney fee issue and this appeal and have independently sought
their advice and their analysis of the issues and the risks involved.

Based upon the advice of their independent counsel,

the depositors, through their representatives, have agreed to
settle the attorney fee dispute. Under the terms of the settlement, the appellants have agreed to take $400,000 less than the
initial fee award, and the $400,000 thus saved will be available
to pay the on-going expenses of litigating the depositors' pending
claims against the other defendants.
The settlement is in the best interests of the depositor
class.

The depositors have claims pending against the other

defendants.

These claims have received little attention for

the last year, while the appellants have been awaiting and challenging the special master's Third Interim Report cind Recommendation and the trial court's memorandum decision based thereon.
The depositors want the appellants to continue to represent them
in their pending claims against the other defendants.

The de-

positors believe that it would require a substantial investment
of time and money for other attorneys to take over the prosecution
of the depositors' claims against the other defendants. If this
- 12 -

court approves the settlement, the depositors' attorneys will
have a solution they find acceptable, the depositors will have
cash with which to pursue their remaining claims, and both sides
can immediately get on with the business of recovering additional
monies, for the benefit of all class members.

CONCLUSION
Obviously, the depositors are not interested in paying
their attorneys an excessive fee.

However, the depositors are

pleased with the results their attorneys have obtained thus far
in pulling some $44,000,000.00 out of a hat that everyone thought
was empty. The depositors believe that their chances of recovering even more of their lost funds will be increased if the same
attorneys continue to represent them in the actions still pending.
Any change in their representation at this time could jeopardize
the depositors' chances of further recovery. The depositors thus
have a strong interest in resolving the attorney fee issue in a
way that is acceptable to both sides to this appeal.
Accordingly, the depositors respectfully request that
this court approve the stipulated settlement between them and
the appellants. In the alternative, the depositors respectfully
request that the court reverse the trial court's October 31,
1989, Memorandum Decision and reinstate the trial court's December
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6, 1988, Order awarding the appellants attorney fees in the amount
of $5,800,000.00.
DATED this 18th day of May, 1990.
CRAIG G. ADAMSON, ESQ.
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING
and
STEWART M. HANSON, JR., ESQ.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Appellees

Bys
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four true and correct copies of
the above and foregoing Brief of Appellees was mailed, postage
prepaid thereon, this 18th day of May, 1990, to:
Jackson Howard, Esq.
Leslie W. Slaugh, Esq.
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Thomas T. Billings, Esq.
Robert D. Merrill, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, #1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
R. Paul Van Dam
Jan C. Graham
Reed M. Stringham, III
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Sheila Bohard
D.O.I.T.
P.O. Box 9516
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101

ISA

PS10.26
- 15 -

ADDENDUM

- 16 -

JACKSON HOWARD, ESQ. (#1548)
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, ESQ. (#3752)
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Attorneys for Appellants
CRAIG G. ADAMSON, ESQ. (#0024)
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
STEWART M. HANSON, JR. (#1356)
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Clark Learning Office Center, Suite 700
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
Attorneys for Appellees
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DOLLY PLUMB, et al,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,

!
:{

vs.

i

THE STATE OF UTAH, et al,

i

Defendants,
MALCOMB A. MISURACA, HALEY &
STOLEBARGER, DOUGLAS B.
PROVENCHER, and BEYERS, COSTIN &
CASE,

i:

STIPULATION TO DISMISS
APPEAL

Case No. 900012

i
Third District Court
:t Civil No. C87-4879

Appellants*
Appellants, Malcoxnb A. Hisuraca, Haley & Stolebarger,
Douglas B. Provencher, and Beyers, Costin & Case, by and through

their attorney Jackson Howard, Esq. and Leslie W. Slaugh, Esq,
and Appellees, by and through their counsel, on Appeal, Craig G.
Adamson, Esq. and Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Esq., stipulate and agree
as follows:
1.

This Appeal is before this Court pursuant to a Rule

54(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure certification on the sole issue
of the attorneys' fees to be awarded to Appellants as counsel for
Appellees under an agreement for attorneys' fees entered into
between the parties.
2.

The action underlying this Appeal involves the

Appellees as a depositor class and its representatives (Depositors
of Insured Thrifts known as "DOIT") consisting of approximately
seven thousand (7,000) households holding approximately seventeen
thousand (17,000) accounts in five failed thrift institutions in
the State of Utah, who seek recovery of the lost deposit accounts.
Appellees have not had access to the funds in their accounts since
July 31, 1986.
3.

Subsequent to the failure of the thrift institutions,

Appellees, through their representatives, employed Appellants to
represent them.

This occurred after an extensive search and

interview process involving a number of prospective attorneys.
After

negotiations

between

the

Appellants'

and

Appellees'

representatives, a written attorneys' fee agreement was reached
between Appellants and Appellees.
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The written attorneys' fee

agreement provided, among other things, that Appellants would be
awarded a reasonable attorneys' fee to be determined by the Trial
Court and the parties agreed that a reasonable fee would be between
twenty (20) and forty (40) percent of the recovery.
4.

Thereafter, one hundred percent (100%) of the class

members responding (of 80% of the class polled) expressly consented
to and ratified the Fee Agreement.
5.

Appellees are of the view that Appellants thereupon

devoted a substantial portion of their time%nd financial resources
for the benefit

of Appellees, including extensive discovery,

investigation and research in establishing the validity of the
claims of the Appellees.

Despite the substantial obstacles to

any successful recovery, Appellants were successful in securing a
partial recovery for Appellees in the approximate sum of $44
million.
6.

Weighing the risks and obstacles mitigating against

any significant recovery in this action, it is the belief of
Appellees that Appellants' efforts in raising and advocating novel
and effective legal theories resulted in a recovery that would
not have occurred without the efforts of Appellants.
7.

Thereafter, a petition to establish the amount of

attorneys' fees was filed with the Trial Court pursuant to the
Agreement between the parties. In that petition, Appellants cledmed
that a fee of twenty-five percent (25%) of $29 million of the total
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$44 million recovery was reasonable.

Notice was given to all

members of the class and a hearing was scheduled at which the
parties could raise objections and at which the fee claimed would
be presented to the Court for approval. Only two depositors filed
objections to the claimed fee and the record discloses no evidence
that any member of the class appeared in Court at the time of the
hearing to object to the claimed fee.
8.

The settlement with the State was submitted for

approval to the depositor class, with notice that the fees to
counsel for the class might run as high as $7,250,000. The class
overwhelmingly voted to accept the settlement; 99.99% of the vote
on the settlement was in favor of its acceptance.
9.

Thereafter, after full and proper notice was given

and an opportunity to be heard was provided as required by law,
the Trial Court, by Memorandum Decision dated December 5, 1988,
determined that a reasonable attorneys' fee to be awarded to
Appellants

was

$5,800,000.00.

twenty

percent

(20%)

of

$29

million,

or

That ruling was reduced to a formal, written

decision on December 6, 1988.
10.

Subsequent to that award and during most of the

succeeding year, significant amounts of time and effort were devoted
by counsel for all parties to the issue before the Trial Court
concerning attorneys' fees, all of which detracted from the main
focus of the litigation, namely, to recover the lost funds.
- 4 -

11.

Subsequent to the entry of the Trial Court's order

making that award, a number of events occurred, many of which are,
or are expected to be, part of the issues on this Appeal, relating
to

the

appointment

of

a

Special

Master

and

the

subsequent

modification of the Trial Court's award of attorneys' fees, whereby
in November 1989, nearly a year later, the fees for Appellants were
reduced to $4,250,000.
12.

It is from that November 1989 ruling of the Trial

Court that Appellants have appealed to thi| Court.
13.

Considering the length of time that has passed since

Appellees and the class suffered the original loss, and the period
of

time

having

attorneys'

fees

elapsed since the Court's original award of
on

December

5,

1988, and

in

light of the

significant, troubling and complicated legal issues presented or
expected to be presented to this Court on this Appeal, both parties
are of the belief that an extensive Appeal process and likely
further litigation before the Trial Court on these issues do not
serve the best interest of the depositors or the public and will
only delay the completion of the litigation process leading up to
a potential recovery of additional amounts and sums lost by the
Appellees resulting from the failure of the thrifts.

From the

foregoing, both parties have concluded that a settlement of the
issues on this Appeal is in the best interest of all parties.
14.

In a survey of the depositors at the time of the
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settlement with the State, an overwhelming majority of the depositor
class (94.40%) voted to authorize DOIT and its counsel to carry
out the best interests of the depositors.

This settlement has

been unanimously approved by the depositor plaintiffs and by the
board of DOIT.
15.

Appellees have now retained separate counsel to

represent their interests in connection with the fee dispute and
this Appeal, and have independently sought their advice and analysis
of the issues and risks of this case. Based upon the advice those
counsel, and Appellees' independent belief that the fee agreed to
herein in resolution of this matter, is a reasonable fee, and based
upon the Appellants' desire to resolve the issues before this Court
without protracted litigation, both parties stipulate and agree
as follows:
a.

A reasonable fee in this matter to be awarded

to Appellants is the sum of $5,400,000, as of December 6,
1988, together with interest which has accrued thereon.
This Court should enter an order in settlement of this Appeal
awarding Appellants such amount;
b.

The sum of $400,000, together with interest

which has accrued thereon from and after December 6, 1988,
should

be

disbursed

to

and

held

by

the

Appellees'

representative, the Depositors of Insured Thrifts (DOIT),
for and on behalf of the Appellees and the depositor class
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to enable Appellees to meet and pay the ongoing expenses of
litigation and other expenses as determined by DOIT necessary
to further the interests of the class and at the conclusion
of the litigation to pay the balance to the class. This Court
should enter an order in settlement of this Appeal, directing
the distribution of such award.
c.

Twenty percent

(20%) is the percentage the

parties agree constitutes a reasonable attorneys' fee on all
amounts recovered for and on behalf of Appellees in the future.
The Court should enter an order in settlement of this Appeal
approving twenty percent (20%) attorneys' fee for Appellants
on all amounts recovered for and on behalf of Appellees
hereafter under the original Fee Agreement between the parties.
DATED this

/ ^ d a v of April, 1990.

KiCtmcrtLdfiW^<^
ckson Howard, Esq.
slie W. Slaugh, Esq.
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
Attorneys for Appellants

and

Stekatt M.
Syitter Axlan
(Attorneys f
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